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Abstract
We carry out two experiments to test a model of herd behaviour
based on the work of Banerjee (1992). He shows that herding occurs
as a result of people observing the actions of others and using this
information in their own decision rule. However, in our experiments
herding does not occur as frequently as Banerjee predicts. Contrary to
his results, the subjects' behaviour appears to depend on the probabil-
ities of receiving a signal and of this signal being correct. Furthermore,
he nds that the pattern of decision making over a number of rounds
of the game is volatile whereas we nd that decision making is volatile
within rounds.

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The usual disclaimer applies.
1
1 Introduction.
The overwhelming impression gained from the expanding literature on herd
behaviour is that herding may well be a serious problem. The only ex-
perimental work that has investigated any of this theoretical material is
that of Anderson and Holt (1997)(which tests the model of Bikhchandani,
Hirschleifer and Welch (1992)) conrms this general impression.
The framework used in most of this literature is that of a sequential
model in which agents receive some kind of information signal and then must
take a decision based on that signal. However, the model of Bikhchandani,
Hirschleifer and Welch represents a special case in which the subjects face
a simple choice between two possible decisions and always receive a signal -
which takes a particularly simple (binary) form. In contrast, our experiment
provides a richer environment in which to examine herd behaviour. The
model that we test includes the possibility that people do not receive a signal.
In addition, there is an innite set of possible decisions.
The experiment is based on the model developed by Banerjee (1992). This
model provides the motivation for a great deal of the more recent literature
on informational cascades and presents some very powerful results. First, the
probabilities of receiving a signal, and of that signal indicating the correct
decision, do not inuence the optimal strategy. This seems counter intuitive
since one would assume that these probabilities would play a role in an
individual's choice of action. Second, individual's are privately optimising;
however, the result is socially suboptimal. Third, herds set in at an early
stage in this model: if the rst two individuals follow the same course of
action then a herd cannot be broken. Finally, the probability of an incorrect
herd may be high: this does depend on the values of receiving a signal and
of that signal being correct.
In addition to performing two experiments to test the validity of this
model, we stress an important theoretical point. Our investigation reveals
that a particular assumption of his model which he claims merely reduces
the probability of herding is crucial to the solution of the model. The Baner-
jee strategy produces an elegant result in which the decision rule remains
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the same regardless of (a) an individual's position in the sequence, (b) his
probability of receiving a signal and (c) the probability of that signal being
correct. We show that the removal of this seemingly innocuous assumption
generates an optimal decision rule which diers according to each of these
factors.
The aim of this paper is to test the null hypothesis that individuals behave
according to the strategy given by Banerjee. This is important since if they
do behave in this manner, this implies a large degree of herding. The paper
is set out as follows. First, we describe Banerjee's model and specify the op-
timal strategy. We then illustrate the importance of the assumption referred
to in the paragraph above in the context of his model. We then describe our
experimental design which had two objectives: rst, to see whether subjects
did indeed follow Banerjee's strategy; second, to see if changes in the un-
derlying parameters of the model aected behaviour in the way indicated by
that strategy. We then analyse the results from each of the two experiments
and draw conclusions.
2 Model.
There is a 'winning number' which lies between 0 and 1. Subjects must try
and discover this winning number. Subjects who do, gain a prize, z. All other
subjects receive a payment of 0. The population consists of N people who
move sequentially. The order in which they move is determined exogenously.
If an individual is informed, he receives a signal. This occurs with probability
. This signal is a number between 0 and 1. This signal coincides with the
winning number with probability . With probability 1   this signal is a
uniformly generated random number between 0 and 1. To solve the model,
Banerjee analyses a `Bayesian-Nash equilibrium'
1
. An important property of
this is that the equilibrium decision rule is the same for all parameter values.
Banerjee uses three assumptions.
2
These are as follows:
1
This is Banerjee's terminology. However, we shall henceforth refer to this as the
`optimal strategy' since the game is a sequential one. Individuals base their decisions on
the actions of previous players plus their own signal.
2
He states that `the relevance of these assumptions will become clear in the appropriate
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Assumption A - If a player has received no signal and all other previous
player have chosen 0, he must also choose 0.
Assumption B - If a player is indierent between following his own signal and
another player's choice, he will follow his own signal.
Assumption C - If a player is indierent between following more than one of
the previous players, he will follow the one with the highest signal.
It should be noted that Assumption A is of a dierent type to that of
Assumptions B and C: in the context of an experiment, B and C are impos-
sible to impose since it is not possible to establish whether individuals are
indierent between options. Therefore, these have not been included in our
experiment. However, assumption A can be implemented: in our rst exper-
iment, we include assumption A while in the second experiment, assumption
A is dropped and subjects are allowed to make a guess at the winning option.
Given assumptions A, B and C, Banerjee oers a solution to the model
in the form of an optimal decision rule for each individual. This optimal
strategy is adopted by each individual irrespective of their order of play.
This is a particularly interesting point since the optimal strategy is the same
for each player despite the fact that they move sequentially.
The rst player follows his own signal if he receives one. If he does not
get a signal, he is obliged by assumption A to choose i = 0: The subsequent
individuals will adopt the following rules. They will follow their own signals
either if and only if:
(i) the signal matches that of another player or if this does not hold
(ii) no option has been chosen by more than one person apart from i = 0:
If a player receives a signal which does not match the action of a previous
player, he will choose the option chosen by more than one of the individuals.
If the option with the highest value of i has been chosen by more than one
context. It should also be possible to see that each of the assumptions is made to minimise
the possibility of herding.'
4
person, he will choose this option providing that no other option has been
chosen by more than one person and no one else's choice matches his own
signal.
If the player does not receive a signal, then he will choose i = 0, due
to assumption A, if everyone else has chosen this. If some option has been
chosen by more than one person, then he will also choose this. However, if
no option has been chosen more frequently than any of the others, he will
choose the one with the highest value of i.
A crucial point to note here is that, according to his rule, the decision
rule forming the optimal strategy holds irrespective of the values of  and .
If Assumption A is removed, this feature no longer holds.
3 Importance of Assumption A.
The crucial dierence between the model including assumption A and the
model omitting assumption A is that the same sequence of signals will gen-
erate dierent sequences of observations. In discussing the experiment, we
refer to assumption A as Rule A. The reason is that in the rst experiment,
this assumption is imposed whereas in the second experiment it is omitted.
A player bases his action on the signal he receives and the actions of the pre-
vious players. Thus, his own action depends on whether the rule is imposed
or omitted. We demonstrate this through a table which analyses the possible
decisions facing player 3 in the sequence.
In table 1, we have shown each possible combination of signals received
by each of the three players. These are denoted by bold type and are given
in the rst three columns.
The signals of players 1 and 2 generate actions which player 3 observes. He
observes their actions but not the signals which they have received. Columns
4 and 5 illustrate the actions of players 1 and 2 when assumption A is in-
cluded. The sixth column shows player 3's optimal action given the signal
he has received plus the observations he makes of previous players' decisions.
Actions of players are denoted by italics.
Columns 7 and 8 give the actions of players 1 and 2 when assumption A
5
is omitted. Player 3 bases his decision on his observations and his own signal
if he receives one. The result is seen in the ninth column.
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The main point to note is that player 3's optimal decision diers consid-
erably when the assumption is removed. In the rst nine rows of this table,
we show the sequences of signals for which the optimal strategy of player
3 is the same irrespective of assumption A. However, in rows 10 to 15, the
optimal strategy is dependent on assumption A. In the last 3 rows, the action
of player 3 depends on the relative sizes of  and .
3
Consequently, problems emerge in the lower half of the decision tree. The
fact that a player is allowed to make a guess at the winning option when he
has no signal reduces the information available to others. We have shown
that, as a result, player 3's decision becomes more complex and depends on
the relative sizes of  and . This has repercussions for the decisions of
players later in the sequence. They will use the sizes of  and  to arrive
at their own optimal decision. Furthermore, they will assume that previous
players have also used these values in their decision rules and build this into
their own decision. It follows that there is no single strategy which applies
to each player irrespective of his position in the sequence.
4 Experimental Design.
The purpose of the experiment was two-fold: rst, to test whether subjects
follow the Banerjee strategy; second, to investigate whether their behaviour
responds appropriately to changes in the parameters of the model. Accord-
ingly we needed to select appropriate parameter values. In particular we
needed to choose a value for n suciently great to observe the herding pre-
dicted by Banerjee's model, and values for  and  which would enable us to
discern movements in subjects behaviour. A simulation revealed that herd-
ing would set in almost certainly under Banerjee's strategy with a value of
n equal to 7. Moreover, this simulation showed that value of  and of  of
3/4 and 1/4 should be sucient to induce signicant changes in behaviour.
Accordingly we had four parameter sets, all with n equal to 7, composed of
each of the two values of  combined with each of the two values of . We
3
Proofs are available from the authors.
8
then adjusted the prize accordingly so that the expected payment to each
subject in each session would be $7.
We presented each subject in turn with 16 bags. k
1
of these bags contained
10 blank discs; k
2
contained 10 discs all numbered with the winning number;
and k
3
contained 10 discs numbered from 1 to 10. The values of k
1
; k
2
and
k
3
depended upon the desired values for  and .
4.1 Experimental Procedure.
We used a dierent set of subjects for each of the 4 sessions of 10 rounds.
At the start of each session, they were brought into the room and were
seated between large dividing screens to prevent communication during the
experiment. We handed each subject written instructions
4
(as seen in the
appendix) and also read these aloud so as to ensure that each group received
the same information and understood what was expected of them.
The order in which the subjects moved was chosen at random. We asked
each of them in turn to select one of the 16 bags available
5
. From this,
they drew a disc which was either blank or had a number between 1 and
10 printed on it. They were instructed not to reveal this information to the
other subjects. We made a note of the disc drawn for future reference. We
then asked them for their guess at the winning option. We wrote this on the
board at the front of the room for all to see and then approached the next
subject.
When all 7 subjects had chosen the number they believed to be the correct
option, we announced the winning option and awarded the cash prizes. The
process was then repeated for another 9 rounds after which the session was
completed. For each session the subjects were informed of the number of bags
containing the winning option, the numbers 1 to 10 and the blank discs.
4
In the experiment omitting Rule A, the paragraph placing restrictions on subjects if
they chose a blank disc from the bag was dropped.
5
without, of course, knowing which bags the previous subjects had selected
9
5 Results.
Firstly, our experiment revealed that herding did not occur as frequently as
the theory predicted under certain sets of parameter values for the experi-
ment with rule A. When this rule was not imposed, the degree of herding
was consistent with and sometimes exceeded that predicted by the Banerjee
simulation. Secondly, contrary to Banerjee's theory, the subjects appeared
to use the values of  and  in formulating their decision.
The results of each of the sessions are reported in the appendix. They
are laid out so as to show the number drawn by each of the subjects together
with their corresponding choice. In the nal column, the winning option is
stated. In the rst instance, we will set out the results for the experiment
in which Banerjee's rule A was enforced. We will then compare these results
with the experiment in which this rule was relaxed.
5.1 Experiment Including Rule A.
In examining the results from each experiment we distinguish between aver-
age behaviour in each session and specic behaviour in each position of play.
The tables summarising specic behaviour are not reported in this paper but
may be obtained from the authors. Those tables showing average behaviour
can be found in the appendix.
6
Table 4 illustrates the actual and predicted proportions of true and false
herds and also the proportions of true and false runs in the rst experiment.
For each of these predicted proportions we have included a condence inter-
val.
7
Under Banerjee's denition, a herd occurs when 2 subjects choose the
same action. However, while we nd that herds started, inspection of the
6
In each session, the actual number of signals received fell within the 95% condence
interval for that which was predicted. In examining the actual number of correct signals
received, all but those of session 3 lay within the 95% interval. This is as one would expect.
7
Note that the n value equals 10 since we are considering the number of rounds in each
session. This implies that np and n(1  p) are smaller than 5 and hence the proportions
cannot be approximated by a normal distribution. We have included this measure in the
absence of a suitable alternative but the results must be viewed with a degree of cau-
tion. Caution should also be exercised in that some of our analysis assumes independence
between observations, which is almost certainly not the case.
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data in the appendix reveals that these were frequently broken. Therefore,
we distinguish between a `run' and a `herd'. If 2 or more consecutive subjects
follow the same number but this is subsequently broken by another subject
choosing a dierent option, we denote this as a `run'. However, if this is not
broken we describe this as a `herd'.
In session 1, there are no true herds but one true run. This is not signif-
icantly dierent from that which the theory predicts. However, there were
signicantly fewer false herds setting in than the theory predicted. We found
that the subjects displayed a much stronger tendency to follow their individ-
ual signals or appeared to choose randomly.
In session 2, the number of true herds was smaller than predicted by
Banerjee. However, there were a number of true runs occurring. The same
pattern emerged for the number of false herds. There was just one false herd
in this session. However, there were three false runs.
In session 3, the proportion of true herds was close to that predicted by
Banerjee. There were also two runs occurring. However, the number of false
herds was signicantly lower than predicted. However, there were a number
of false runs emerging. If these had not been broken, the total number of
false herds would have been close to that predicted by the Banerjee strategy.
In session 4, the actual proportions of true and false herds corresponds
to that predicted by the Banerjee rule with just one true run occurring.
In table 2, we report the proportion of rounds in each session which were
compatible with the Banerjee strategy. This proves to be very revealing
since his strategy is only closely followed in one of the four sessions. This
would suggest that in the other sessions, subjects are adopting an alternative
approach.
In analysing the specic behaviour of subjects, we examine their actions
conditional on whether they receive a signal. When  and  both equal 0.25,
subjects appear to follow their own signal if they get one. However, in session
2, with  equal to 0.75, there were 3 occasions in which subjects abandoned
their own signal. In session 3, the strategy appeared to change according to
the position of play. For earlier players in the rounds, there was a tendency to
follow their own signal. However, later players abandoned their own signal.
11
In session 4, subjects playing early in the round had a tendency to follow
their own signal. However, later subjects were more willing to abandon their
own signal if it did not match that of an existing herd.
For those subjects not receiving a signal, there was also a particular pat-
tern of behaviour emerging. In session 1, subjects appeared to choose ran-
domly more often than following the most frequently chosen number. This
occurred for each position of play. In session 2, there was also a strong ten-
dency to choose a number which had not already been chosen. However, for
later rounds, subjects were equally likely to follow the most frequently chosen
number. For sessions 3 and 4 there were very few occasions in which a blank
disc was drawn and the majority of subjects followed the most frequently
chosen number.
5.2 Experiment Without Rule A.
Table 5 shows the actual and predicted proportions of true and false herds
for the experiment plus the actual proportion of true and false runs.
8
Firstly,
it is important to compare the actual results with those predicted. It is also
worthwhile comparing these results with those of the original experiment
since this shows the eect of omitting rule A.
In the rst session, the predicted proportion of false herds exceeded that of
the original Banerjee strategy with assumption A. Conversely, the predicted
proportion of true herds was less than under the original Banerjee strategy.
This implies that the removal of assumption A leads to an increase in the
proportion of incorrect herds when  and  are small. In this session, the
number of herds was close to that which was predicted. However, there were
more runs occurring than under the original Banerjee rule.
In session 2, the predicted proportion of false herds also exceeded that
of the original Banerjee strategy with assumption A. Again, the predicted
proportion of true herds was less than under the original Banerjee strategy.
The main feature of this session, however, was the large number of runs. If
8
In each session, the total number of signals received lay within the 95% condence
interval. However, in session 3, the actual number of correct signals lay slightly outside
the condence interval. Those of the other sessions fell within the condence interval.
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these had not been broken, they would have generated a far greater number
of herds than predicted. This conrms Banerjee's argument that assumption
A reduces the possibility of herding.
In session 3, herding was consistent with that which was predicted. How-
ever, there was a large proportion of false runs. If these had not been broken
they would have created a proportion of false herds signicantly greater than
predicted.
In session 4, herding was close to that predicted but this time there was
a large proportion of true runs.
Table 3 shows the proportion of rounds in which the Banerjee strategy
was played throughout. The main point to note there is that his strategy was
played in only a small proportion of rounds. Also note how this compares
with the original experiment. Session 2 is the same for each experiment and
session 1 is very close. However, the Banerjee strategy is played much more
frequently for sessions 3 and 4 under the original experiment with rule A.
The probability of receiving a signal here is large at 0:75. Therefore, it is
less likely that subjects earlier in the experiment are drawing blank discs and
thus generating false herds through guesswork.
We now summarise the behaviour of those subjects receiving a signal. In
session 1 with the exception of one person, all subjects followed their own
signal if they received one. This is also a feature of session 2. For session 3,
earlier players favour their own signal while players later in the sequence are
more willing to abandon their own signal. In session 4, there is once again a
strong tendency to follow one's own signal.
We now consider those subjects who do not receive a signal. In session
1, we cannot nd an observable pattern emerging. Players appear to alter-
nate between following the most frequently chosen number, another chosen
number and appearing to choose randomly. However, there is a pattern
emerging in session 2 in that there is an increasing tendency to follow the
most frequently chosen number as the session progresses.
In sessions 3 and 4 there are only a few subjects who do not receive a
signal so there is only a small amount of data available here. In session 3,
players 3, 6 and 7 predominantly follow the most frequently chosen number.
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Player 2 only does this 50% of the time and appears to choose randomly for
the remaining 50%. Player 4 displays a tendency to choose randomly rather
then follow the most frequently chosen number. In session 4, subjects always
follow the most frequently chosen option when they do not receive a signal.
6 Conclusion.
Our concluding comments fall into two categories. Firstly there are the
implications of our theoretical ndings. We show that, without assumption
A the whole decision making process becomes dependent on (a) the position
in the sequence and (b) the probabilities,  and .
In terms of future lines of research, this implies the ambitious task of
solving the model without assumption A.
The main result of our experiment with rule A was that herding occurred
less frequently than predicted by the Banerjee framework. The behaviour
of subjects was far more individual than the theory suggested with subjects
using the information on  and  and also their position of play in the
rounds to formulate their decisions. In his model, Banerjee found that there
was tremendous volatility in the pattern of decision making over a number
of plays of the game. This was because the onset of herding and its direction
depended upon the signal received by the rst few individuals. However, we
found that this volatility occurred within rather than between rounds. When
a run set in, it did not necessarily continue. With certain parameter values,
players were inclined to break the run using either their own signal or by
appearing to choose randomly.
In the experiment without rule A, herding was more prevalent than under
the original experiment with assumption A. Signicantly, we also witnessed a
large number of runs which were subsequently broken. These would indicate
a willingness on the part of some subjects to follow a herd and then the
opposite behaviour from other subjects breaking that run. These appeared
to occur regardless of the values of  and  and generated volatility within
rather than between rounds.
In this experiment, subjects were even less inclined to follow the Banerjee
14
strategy. In sessions 1 and 2, there was a strong tendency to apparently
choose randomly rather than the most frequently chosen number when no
signal was received. Given this type of behaviour, it would be revealing to
circulate a questionnaire to each subject following each session asking them
about their strategies in a future experiment to test herding.
15
A Instructions for the Subjects
Welcome to the Experiment!
Firstly, you will notice that you have been partitioned o from the other play-
ers. There is nothing sinister here: one of the few rules that I am imposing
is that you do not communicate with the others.
 I will be running the experiment 10 times and will be awarding a cash
prize of $4 to each player who chooses the winning number in each
round. The aim of the exercise is to nd this winning number.
 For each game that will be played, the winning number and the order
in which you play have been chosen at random. I put discs numbered
1 to 10 into a bag and picked a disc from the bag. This is the winning
number for the rst game. I then replaced the disc and repeated this
to determine the winning numbers for the other 9 rounds.
 I will present each of you, in turn, with 16 bags and you will be asked
to pick one. The bags all look the same but their contents dier. Each
contains 10 discs. Twelve bags contain blank discs. Three of the bags
contain the numbers 1 to 10. The other contains 10 discs with the
winning number.
 You will then draw a number from your chosen bag. Do not disclose
this to anyone.
 I will then ask you to write your chosen number on my clip board. This
may or may not be the number appearing on your disc. You are not
obliged to stick with the number which is written on your disc if you
think you know better.
 The only rule I make regarding your choice of number is that if you
pick a blank disc from the bag, you are not allowed to choose a number
if:
(a) You are the rst person to move in the game or
(b) No one who has moved before you has chosen a number.
16
 I will then write your chosen number on the ip chart for the other
players to see.
 When all the players have chosen the number which they think is the
winner, I will announce the winning number and award the cash prizes.
Good Luck!
17
B Data from the Experiment Including Rule
A
B.1 Session 1 -  and  equal 0.25
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning
Option
- 10 - - - - - - 10 6 3 7 6 4 10
- - - 2 - - 1 - - - 6 6 8 1 1
- 4 - 4 2 - 4 - 4 4 6 2 4 4 10
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8
- - 8 - - - - - - 8 7 2 5 6 5
- - - - - 3 - - - - - - 3 9 8
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
- - - - - 4 2 - - - - - 4 2 5
- - 2 - 2 - - - - 2 2 2 9 3 2
- - - - - 6 - - - - - - 6 7 7
B.2 Session 2 -  equals 0.25 and  equals 0.75
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning
Option
- 10 - - - - - - 10 4 6 6 7 5 10
- 2 - 2 - 2 - - 3 5 2 3 3 5 2
- - - - 3 - 3 - - - - 3 4 3 3
- 9 9 - - - - - 9 9 9 8 9 6 9
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
- - 9 9 6 - 9 - - 9 9 6 5 9 9
- 10 - - - - - - 10 8 6 10 9 10 10
- 4 9 - - - 9 - 4 9 8 4 4 4 9
- - - - 3 - 3 - - - - 3 3 3 3
6 6 - - - - - 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
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B.3 Session 3 -  equals 0.75 and  equals 0.25
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning
Option
4 10 8 - 3 8 - 6 10 6 3 7 4 4 9
9 3 4 3 - - 10 3 3 3 9 4 3 10 3
4 10 8 8 - 1 - 4 4 8 8 8 8 8 8
- 2 4 - - 7 - - 7 4 4 4 7 4 7
3 1 4 1 1 1 9 1 1 4 1 1 1 9 1
1 5 5 - 5 - 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
2 2 2 - - 7 10 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
7 7 7 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
9 6 10 - - 4 6 9 6 9 9 9 9 9 1
8 - 8 7 - - - 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 4
B.4 Session 4 -  and  equal 0.75
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning
Option
5 5 2 5 5 3 5 5 5 2 5 4 5 5 5
9 9 2 2 9 9 - 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
4 1 5 5 - 5 3 4 1 5 5 5 5 5 5
- 3 3 - - 3 - - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
9 1 9 1 9 10 9 9 1 9 1 9 9 9 9
10 10 10 - 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
- 10 - 10 5 1 7 - 10 10 10 10 10 10 5
2 3 - 2 10 2 6 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 4 4 4 5 4 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
3 3 3 10 3 - 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
19
C Data from the Experiment Without Rule
A
C.1 Session 1 -  and  equal 0.25
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning
Option
2 2 - - 3 10 - 2 2 3 3 3 10 7 2
3 - - - - - - 3 8 9 8 9 3 8 3
- - - - - - - 5 5 8 5 8 9 8 4
8 8 5 - - - - 8 8 5 5 5 8 5 7
- - - - - 3 - 4 1 1 9 8 3 5 3
7 10 5 - 6 - 5 7 10 5 5 6 5 5 8
- - - - - 6 - 5 5 5 5 9 6 6 10
- - - - - - - 1 6 5 9 9 1 9 4
- - - - - - 7 5 6 8 10 7 6 7 7
- 9 6 - - 9 - 3 9 9 9 5 9 5 9
C.2 Session 2 -  equals 0.25 and  equals 0.75
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning
Option
- - 3 - 3 - - 6 7 3 4 3 5 3 3
- - 10 8 - 8 - 6 6 6 8 6 8 6 8
- - - - 1 - 1 4 4 7 4 4 4 4 1
- 6 - 2 2 2 2 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2
- - - - 2 2 - 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 2
6 - - 3 - - 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 7
- - - 9 - - - 6 4 6 9 9 4 9 9
- - - - - - - 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 7
8 - - 8 - 8 8 8 6 6 8 8 8 8 8
- - - - - 2 - 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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C.3 Session 3 -  equals 0.75 and  equals 0.25
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning
Option
9 5 5 9 5 9 4 9 5 5 9 6 9 4 9
10 4 - - 8 5 - 7 4 7 8 8 7 8 10
9 2 8 - 3 1 2 9 3 8 8 3 3 3 2
8 8 9 1 1 5 1 1 8 9 1 1 1 1 1
- - 6 6 8 3 - 5 5 6 6 8 6 6 6
9 8 9 - 8 - 5 9 8 9 7 8 9 8 9
7 7 8 10 7 - 10 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 2
- 3 7 7 4 - 6 8 3 7 7 7 7 10 6
3 - 3 3 6 - - 3 10 3 3 3 3 3 3
8 8 8 2 5 4 - 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
C.4 Session 4 -  and  equal 0.75
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning
Option
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 9 9 1 5 9 - 9 9 9 9 5 9 9 9
1 1 1 - - 6 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1
6 10 - 10 - 10 10 6 6 6 10 6 10 10 10
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
8 8 10 10 1 - - 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 8
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 10 1 1 10 1 1 10 10 1 1 10 1 1 1
10 10 10 10 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
3 6 - 3 3 3 6 3 6 3 3 3 3 3 3
21
D Results From Each Experiment

0.25 0.75
 0.25 0.125 0.2222
0.75 0.4 0.9
Table 2: Proportion of Rounds in which the Banerjee Strategy is
Played For the Experiment Including Rule A

0.25 0.75
 0.25 0.1 0.2222
0.75 0.1 0.3
Table 3: Proportion of Rounds in which the Banerjee Strategy is
Played For the Experiment Without Rule A
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